Parents (Total: 9)

The searched file hash is included in 9 parent files which include package known and seen by metalookup. A sample is included below:

Key	Value
MD5	CB3759FDC086EF08EFFCFB6D8730296A
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	lp152.1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	D742502C77F7E003B1F9F346FFF9E109C0AEEB98
SHA-256	E8BC9945569A763B25B98F06B0ED10CDF2AAC0647B03FF1D8919EE8B1F040F73

Key	Value
MD5	FB057CD54453C5E481FA5165AAEB6909
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	lp151.1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	8980990ADFB149EC566422B160274AB2B6C3AA65
SHA-256	75C73727DC8347C6A2B94C982DBAF6E6548A5B09E3915CB73E202DB628B27370

Key	Value
MD5	751D9BF02D2FF4D5C880142B1E2683A5
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	6DF0195700450C8A89FDFE38BCE6DC3D0ED20C44
SHA-256	DA880AB203D1DADF18DCF42143B9989606B04F7B8F7118359A52AA965DF74E67

Key	Value
MD5	3D6CFA2C8B100F54E8175D75B9338A47
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	1.2
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	5C0213A844E64F5921802DE4CA54B8449DE0464D
SHA-256	45FE552BC04BB7DFAEDC21AB49F1EC8A02048AD8E817C363C8C15F9525F54007

Key	Value
MD5	79CDD7161F3923D0185C6BE5BF2CDC0A
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	25FB433A756E0A684EDB4A7D011289FC52BFDE62
SHA-256	2D5FD9CAE40BC8B9B409050E408E4621D9D2669DEAD204A2F482FFEF8009CAAF

Key	Value
MD5	F67B5BDD81608BCA0CDB6BB8B2E97D8A
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	lp153.1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	3F19AD7B79B41A4D3FE8AF0C27D436BAFE9E037A
SHA-256	51832FDA49EAEF221BE7F67F3B7559D2988492C25390B93C2C7C3548B605DF8B

Key	Value
MD5	15E854BACC010E6F1BB240C111EBFA86
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	lp150.1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	A2C65B9D48C2B5FDE5EF62B9DACFE70815A09E13
SHA-256	E780322138C6E24D23661E9D857ABF3EABA48B9043CAB89DAC1AF93F8EE6A525

Key	Value
MD5	15024D4028690559C1B861EF8F8C7162
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	1.9
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	A4A46101FA4066D472B44F38C15080F2ACA1D720
SHA-256	C39922D00418C14B93DB75853A4DD89F518A9A71CD7C8CE14658F502991EE2A7

Key	Value
MD5	B0980ACA2F636494C8DAB02C9995BCC8
PackageArch	noarch
PackageDescription	This module implements a secure way to encode session data. It is primarily intended for storing session data in browser cookies, but could be used with other backend storage where security of stored session data is important. Features include: * Data serialization and compression using Sereal * Data encryption using AES with a unique derived key per encoded session * Enforced expiration timestamp (optional) * Integrity protected with a message authentication code (MAC) The storage protocol used in this module is based heavily on at http://www.cse.msu.edu/~alexliu/publications/Cookie/Cookie_COMNET.pdf by Alex Liu and others. Liu proposes a session cookie value as follows: user|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(user|expiration|data|ssl-key,k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(user|expiration, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers ssl-key is an SSL session key Because SSL session keys are not readily available (and SSL termination may happen prior to the application server), we omit 'ssl-key'. This weakens protection against replay attacks if an attacker can break the SSL session key and intercept messages. Using 'user' and 'expiration' to generate the encryption and MAC keys was a method proposed to ensure unique keys to defeat volume attacks against the secret key. Rather than rely on those for uniqueness (with the unfortunate side effect of revealing user names and prohibiting anonymous sessions), we replace 'user' with a cryptographically-strong random salt value. The original proposal also calculates a MAC based on unencrypted data. We instead calculate the MAC based on the encrypted data. This avoids an extra step decrypting invalid messages. Because the salt is already encoded into the key, we omit it from the MAC input. Therefore, the session storage protocol used by this module is as follows: salt|expiration|E(data,k)|HMAC(expiration|E(data,k),k) where | denotes concatenation with a separator character E(p,q) is a symmetric encryption of p with key q HMAC(p,q) is a keyed message hash of p with key q k is HMAC(salt, sk) sk is a secret key shared by all servers The salt value is generated using Math::Random::ISAAC::XS, seeded from Crypt::URandom. The HMAC algorithm is 'hmac_sha256' from Digest::SHA. Encryption is done by Crypt::CBC using Crypt::Rijndael (AES). The ciphertext and MAC's in the cookie are Base64 encoded by MIME::Base64 by default. During session retrieval, if the MAC does not authenticate or if the expiration is set and in the past, the session will be discarded.
PackageName	perl-Session-Storage-Secure
PackageRelease	1.1
PackageVersion	1.000
SHA-1	69BCEFE53987454F21D31BD631051E348DD600C8
SHA-256	0BAF6F3E298EA0535AEF3E6362F5B9DD16CBA5963E06F6002208328532FE290C